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Abstract 
 
Over the years, research has demonstrated that conflict spreads to the host country as a 
consequence of massive influx of refugees. Most studies gathered empirical evidence from 
African countries and focused on cases where conflict had already spread. In contrast to this 
literature, the main objective of this thesis is to examine the absence of conflict in Jordan after 
receiving Syrian refugees that amount to about 10 percent of Jordan’s original population over 
the past three years, 2011-2014. In order to understand the absence of tension, this thesis 
applies three tripartite determinants of stability deducted from the previous literature: 
economic and foreign policy, institutional capacity for handling the refugee influx, and the 
demographic composition of the refugees. Examination of these determinants in the Jordanian 
situation lays the foundation for empirical analysis.  
The study concludes that mainly three factors have kept Jordan stable: the majority of 
the Jordanian people’s wish for stability, or rather their fear of ending up in the same situation 
as their neighbors; the political and economic support from foreign actors and patrons; and 
finally, Jordan’s willingness and capability to control the borders and provide security. This 
study shows that all three factors are intertwined as stability is being secured through 
monetary and military support, which helps Jordan pay the military and intelligence expenses 
needed to prevent spillover from Syria. This support also pays for the political support from 
the citizens through subsidies and public sector employment in an effort to shield the citizens 
from the de facto deteriorating economic situation. This fragile stability has been the situation 
in Jordan the past three years, 2011-2014, but there are no guarantees that this will continue.  
Regardless of the seemingly solid stabilizing factors, the balance of stability in Jordan 
is fragile and could be disrupted very easily. Several of the findings in this thesis prove to be 
dynamic and will likely change over time. The way the Government of Jordan (GoJ) is 
handling the refugee crisis is seemingly going in the direction of stronger security and less 
freedom for the refugees. Dissatisfaction between the refugees will grow as the crisis protracts 
if they are not allowed to create a new life in Jordan. The demographic composition of the 
refugees is also changing. Initially the composition proved to be a stabilizing influence, but as 
the crisis persists, more and more refugees are becoming involved in the fighting in Syria, 
making them more prone to violence. Creeping donor fatigue is also a problem for the future 
stability of Jordan, at least with the present refugee response plan that is proving to be far too 
expensive in the long-term perspective. What could be said with certainty is that the trajectory 
of the situation in Jordan at this point is far from set. 
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Preface 
 
This thesis presents an analysis of the current stability in Jordan and its main objective is to 
explain this stability despite the massive influx of Syrian refugees. The previous semester I 
wrote a report for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jordan and the University of Oslo (UiO) 
on the impacts of the Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labor market. During the research for 
this report I started to realize the dimension of the impacts of the refugees on the Jordanian 
society, environment, economy as well as the country’s political agenda. While living in 
Jordan I discussed this with family and friends back home, and they asked me “so you would 
initially expect Jordan to be more destabilized?” I was not sure how to answer to this 
question. I had to look deeper into the matter, and I chose Jordan’s surprising stability as the 
topic for my master’s thesis.  
A second motivation for choosing this particular topic is the current need for 
information on impacts of the Syrian refugees in Jordan. The Government of Jordan (GoJ), 
non-government organizations (NGOs) and other humanitarian actors are all calling for 
research papers and reports on the refugee situation. Amman, the capital of Jordan, is today 
considered the humanitarian hub for Syrian relief efforts. If the international society wants 
Amman to continue to be the humanitarian hub, and Jordan to continue to receive and protect 
Syrian refugees, destabilization must be avoided. Nevertheless, destabilization due to a 
prolonged influx of Syrian refugees is not an unlikely future scenario. 
 In the case of Jordan where destabilization could be expected, it is important to 
analyze the different factors that could both create and prevent tensions and destabilization in 
order to prevent possible crisis. This study is not aiming to give the definite answers and 
present solutions to all of Jordan’s future challenges concerning stability, but it is aiming to 
contribute to the hopefully increasing amount of literature on this topic, which is so 
desperately needed.  
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Abbreviations/ definitions 
 
ACAPS – the Assessment Capacities Project 
ACTED – l’Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement 
BG – Brigadier General 
Black September – The civil war in Jordan in the 1970s between the Jordanian government 
and radicalized fractions of the Palestinian refugees.  
Bn – billion (1000 million) 
CARE – Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 
CEO – Chief Executive Officer 
DRSJ – Directorate of Syrian Refugees in Jordan 
Fafo – Norwegian research foundation 
Fedayeen – Arabic word for freedom fighter, often used as a term for a variety of Arabic 
militant groups 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment 
GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council 
GoJ – Government of Jordan 
GID – General Intelligence Department  
H.E. – His Excellency  
IAF – Islamic Action Front 
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross  
IDP – Internally Displaced Person 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, an al-Qaida affiliated group fighting in Syria 
Jabhat al-nusra – Arabic name for a branch of al-Qaida fighting in Syria 
JAF – Jordanian Armed Forces 
JOD – Jordanian Dinars 
JT – Jordan Times 
xii 
 
MoL – Ministry of Labor 
MoPIC – Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding 
Mukhabarat – Arabic term for intelligence agency. 
NGO – Non-government organization 
NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council 
PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organization 
PRS – Palestinian Refugees from Syria 
PTSD – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder  
SNAP – Syria Need Analysis Project 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near 
East. 
Za’atari – Jordan’s largest refugee camps for Syrians in the northern region of Mafraq (see 
map next page). 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is an inherent concern in international politics that instability in a refugee sending 
country will spill into neighboring host countries, affecting ever-growing numbers of people 
and becoming increasingly complex to resolve.
1
 However, although refugee influxes can 
create security concerns, there is no reason to expect deterministic links between refugees and 
conflict. In fact, the vast majority of the world’s refugees never directly engage in political 
violence, and most recipient countries never experience armed violence as a consequence of a 
refugee influx.
2
  
As Lake and Rotchild (1998) state, “conflict does diffuse abroad […] “but largely to 
states that already contain the seeds of discord”.3 An obvious question would then be: does 
Jordan contain the seeds of discord? Or, rather, enough seeds to tip the balance of stability? 
The immediate answer would be yes, taking into consideration Jordan’s geographical position 
and geopolitical role, internal political disputes involving tribal Jordanians and Jordanians of 
Palestinian descent as well as Islamists, secularists, and monarchists. On top of this, the 
Kingdom is struggling with energy problems, water scarcity, growing unemployment rate and 
wealth gap, and public debt and corruption. It might be said that Jordan is, as written in the 
Economist November 2013 “surprisingly stable for the moment”.4 
In late 2012 and early 2013 demonstrations and violent outbreaks were not uncommon 
in Jordan. Tension was building up between refugees and Jordanians and between Jordanians 
and the state. The unrest did not escalate into conflict nor did it challenge Jordan’s stability. 
Rather, it died out quietly. Over time, street protests have drawn diminishing crowds, showing 
a sign of declining opposition clout. Refugees were also dissatisfied with the state and the 
response from humanitarian organizations. Consequently, tension arose, especially in Za’atari, 
Jordan’s largest camp for Syrian refugees. The trouble which raged in Za’atari the winter 
2012-2013 due to bad handling of the massive refugee influx and lack of control did also 
                                                 
1
 Beth Elise Whitaker, “Refugees and the spread of conflict: contrasting cases in Central Africa”, Journal of 
Asian and African Studies vol.38 no.2-3, (June 2003): 211-231, 211. 
2
 Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the spread of civil war”, International 
Organization vol.60 no.2, (2001), 335-366, 336. 
3
 Whitaker, “Refugees and the spread of conflict”, 226. 
4
 The Economist, “Jordan: Surprisingly stable for the moment”, the Economist print edition, Middle East and 
Africa:  http://www.economist.com/node/21589493/, published  09.11.13 accessed 30.01.14. 
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calmed and Za’atari has never seen this current stability.5 The Kingdom seems as strong and 
stable as ever – at least more stable than prior to the outbreak of the regional wave of 
demonstrations and protests commonly referred to as the Arab Spring. Yet, the mood in the 
Kingdom remains anxious. Why hasn’t the massive influx of refugees caused destabilization 
and internal conflict in Jordan? What is the reason for the lack of severe tensions between the 
Jordanian population and their Syrian ‘guests’? 
When economic deterioration and political vulnerability become symptomatic of a 
regime, the presence of a large number of refugees is particularly likely to contribute to the 
overall sense of crisis.
6
 In 2013 Jordan had a public debt constituting 79,5 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP)
7
, and during the previous ten years the government has been 
reshuffled or changed 13 times.
8
 Despite this, unrest has not taken root in Jordan, a country 
which is now hosting more than 600,000 Syrian refugees, approximately 10 percent of its 
population.
9
 Jordan is currently stable, but politically and economically fragile. The refugee 
situation is dynamic, as will be elaborated in this thesis, and persistence of the current stability 
can therefore not be relied upon. Destabilization due to a prolonged influx of Syrian refugees 
is not an unlikely future scenario. In situations where violence can be expected, such as in 
Jordan, it is important to analyze the different factors that could both create and prevent 
tensions and destabilization in order to prevent possible crisis.  
 
Delimitation 
There will undoubtedly be innumerable factors in play preventing or creating tensions in a 
situation like the one Jordan is witnessing today. Not all can be taken into consideration in 
this limited study. The internal political dynamics, interests of the superpowers, availability of 
resources, demographic composition both of the refugees and the locals as well refugee 
                                                 
5
 Kilian Kleinschmidt, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Camp Manager Za’atari, 
briefing in Za’atari during a field visit to the camp 24.11.13. 
6
 Ragnhild Ek and Ahmed Kardawi, “Implications of Refugee Flows on Political Stability in the Sudan”, Ambio 
vol.20 no. 5, (August 1991): 196-203, 196 
7
 At the end of November 2013, official data showed that the public debt represented 79,5 percent of the 
estimated GDP for 2013 compared with 75,5 percent of the GDP  of 2012 (Petra,  “Jordan’s public debt 
balloons, topping JD19b”, The Jordan Times: http://jordantimes.com/jordans-public-debt-balloons-topping-
jd19b, published 28.01.14, accessed 20.05.14). 
8
 Jordanian Government Listing, available at the webpage of The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in Netherlands: 
http://www.jordanembassy.nl/jordan/GL.htm, accessed 18.03.14. 
9
 See UNHCRs Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal online for updated number of UNCHR-registered 
Syrians in Jordan, available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. It is worth mentioning 
that GoJ believes there are 1,350,000 Syrians in Jordan of which 750,000 where economic refugees from before 
the Syrian Crisis (Interview with the Director of the Directorate of Syrian Refugees in Jordan (DSRJ) Brigadier 
General (BG) Dr. Wadah al-Hamoud, 05.11.13). 
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response by the state, international society and the locals are all some of the factors 
influencing the outcome. As mentioned earlier, the majority of the refugee theory focuses on 
conflicts where direct spillover has taken place. This is naturally not the focus of this thesis as 
direct spillover has not yet taken place – and maybe never will. This thesis is looking into 
tension as a whole, whether from spillover as a direct consequence of the crisis in the sending 
country or from tensions created as a consequence of the refugee crisis but not related to the 
conflict in the sending country. The thesis will try to explain why tension, either from within 
or from without, has not yet surfaced focusing on characteristics of the receiving country’s 
economic and foreign policy, institutional capacity and the demographic composition of the 
refugee population. 
 
Structure  
The first chapter sets the framework for the study and provides a short introduction to the 
context. The methodological foundation used in the process of collecting empirical data for 
the study as well as ethical implications and considerations is also explained. 
The first part of the second chapter introduces the academic debate concerning refugee 
influxes and the spread of conflict. In the second part the preexisting theories are narrowed 
down to three hypotheses that will be used for discussion and analysis in the third chapter. 
In chapter three, the three hypotheses deducted from the existing theories are 
examined in order to understand and explain why the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has not 
witnessed more destabilization due to the refugee influx. The analysis emphasizes the pull- 
and push-factors that can affect destabilization. 
The main findings of the thesis are gathered in the fourth and final chapter, along with 
some suggestions for further research on the topic. 
 
Method 
This qualitative case-study builds on empirical data collected during a seven months stay in 
Jordan from August 2013 to March 2014. From August to December 2013, I served as a 
student intern at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Amman, writing a report on the impacts of 
the Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labor market. Informants and information collected for 
that report were equally relevant to the topic of this thesis. The informants were open to 
contributing to my master’s thesis as well; hence the fieldwork from autumn 2013 is added to 
this study. The fieldwork consist of interviews and conversations, field trips, workshops, 
4 
 
meetings, as well as statistics and data gathered from relevant actors in the field, in addition to 
news articles, reports and other secondary sources.  
The interviews conducted for this study were semi-structured allowing me to 
improvise and give follow up questions when needed. Conversations with participants of 
workshops and press releases, and actors met during field visits were planned as informal 
interviews with only an interview guide.
10
 Topics were prepared in advance but the questions 
were open.
11
 This was necessary as I did not know at all times whom I would meet and to 
whom I would be able to talk. The interviewees chosen were mainly government officials, 
NGOs and political analysts for reasons that will be elaborated in the paragraph on ethical 
concerns. Prior to setting up and conducting the interviews, I informed the subjects of the 
purpose of the interviews. Sources I spoke to in 2013 were informed that I was intending to 
use the material for a report to the embassy, but also possibly for the master thesis I planned 
to conclude spring 2014. 
Most of the interviews were held in English as this is the working language for most of 
the government officials, at least those working with international matters or matters 
involving foreigners. There were, however, a couple of interviews where the interviewee 
could express himself much better in Arabic. I did not know this prior to the meetings, but as I 
have studied Arabic one and a half year at the University of Oslo (UiO) and three semesters at 
the University of Damascus in Syria, we managed to understand each other as long the 
interviewees were patient – and they were. At workshops held in Arabic, there was most often 
simultaneous translation available. In cases where this did not work, there was always a 
friendly English speaker who could answer my questions when I doubted my understanding. 
When talking to Syrian refugees during field visits, I only spoke Arabic. These were not deep 
conversations, however, and the language barrier was of minor interference. Regardless of 
this, I did not use anything from the Arabic speaking interviews or conversations that I was 
not a hundred percent certain of that I had understood completely.  
I did not use a recording device during my fieldwork with one exception. When I 
attended a workshop in Irbid, I knew they only spoke Arabic and I decided to use the 
recorder. Without the recorder, I would probably not have remembered some of the details. 
                                                 
10
 Press releases such as for example the launch of the Syrian Regional Response Plan (RRP6) by UNHCR in 
Amman, Jordan 16 December 2013 or workshops held by research institutes or universities studying the impacts 
of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian society. Several actors working with the Syrian refugee issue such as 
government actors, representatives from the international donor society and humanitarian agencies always attend 
such happenings. 
11
 Ottar Hellevik, Forskningsmetode i Sosiologi og Statsvitenskap, 7. Utgave, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2002), 
97-98.  
5 
 
During interviews, I listened carefully and took notes, fearing that a recording device would 
prevent the interviewees from speaking freely – especially government officials. In order to 
be sure the information was correct, I was not afraid to ask the interviewee to repeat the 
answer. Moreover, after every interview I reviewed my notes and tried to recount every detail.  
* * * 
As this is a case-study of one country, the goal is not to generalize the findings to other cases. 
A case-study of one country is an intensive examination employing broad and detailed 
knowledge so as to understand the case in its entirety.
12
 As the renowned political science 
scholar Todd Landman wrote: “[…] single-country studies provide contextual description, 
develop new classifications, generate hypotheses, confirm and infirm theories, and explain the 
presence of deviant countries identified through cross-national comparison”.13  A single case 
study can also give an opportunity to study the development and dynamics of variables, as in 
the case of Jordan where the dynamics of the variables becomes evident.
14
 
 
Ethical concerns 
The impact of the Syrian refugees in Jordan is a topic high up on the agenda both for the 
international society, the Jordanian government and municipalities, as well as Jordanian 
citizens and Syrian refugees. Jordanians at all levels of society are engaged in the topic, but 
the discussion is divisive – and so are the “facts” that flourish in government circles and 
public space. Especially in government circles, there is an impression that there are some 
restrictions on what opinion to express regarding the refugee issue. Out of my respect to the 
wishes of my sources due to their fear of political ramifications or consequences, I have 
chosen to retain some of my source’s anonymity. 15   
Interviewing government officials and employees of humanitarian organizations 
working with refugee management and relief work is different from interviewing traumatized 
refugees. Originally, I planned to interview Syrian refugees also.  However, talking to and 
interviewing refugees traumatized by war is difficult and can have negative consequences for 
the interviewees and the researcher. That is the primary reason why I chose to focus more on 
official sources and humanitarian organizations, and avoided dealing with the refugees 
                                                 
12
 Hellevik, Forskningsmetode, 108-109. 
13
 Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: an Introduction, third edition, (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 28-29. 
14
 Hellevik, Forskningsmetode, 99. 
15
 National Committees for Research Ethics in Norway, Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences, 
Law and the Humanities: https://www.etikkom.no/Documents/Publikasjoner-som-
PDF/Guidelines%20for%20research%20ethics%20in%20the%20social%20sciences,%20law%20and%20the%2
0humanities%20(2006).pdf, published 2006, accessed 30.04.14, 18. 
6 
 
directly. I do not have the experience or credentials to speak with traumatized war refugees, 
so for their sake, I chose not to try and perhaps fail. In matters relating to the demographic 
composition of the refugees, I have used statistics and data collected by humanitarian 
organizations, the government, and other researchers who are more experienced than me in 
the field when it comes to dealing with traumatized refugees.
16
 
 
Refugee Haven 
During the past fifty years, millions of people have crossed international borders to escape 
conflict and trouble in their own countries, bringing problems for the receiving countries. The 
response of receiving countries to such refugee influxes has varied. Some governments have 
received refugees with generosity, while others have tried to prevent refugees from entering, 
or treated them harshly by, for example, restricting their movements. Jordan has in fact the 
highest ratio of refugees to indigenous population of any country, and has during its “career” 
as a receiving country tried a variety of refugee responses.
17
 See table 1 for a historical 
overview of the size of different refugee influxes to Jordan. 
Table 1: Historical overview of refugee influxes to Jordan
18
 
Year Nationality Population Refugees arrived % of population 
1948 Palestinian 400,000 100,000 25 
1967 Palestinian 1,278,416 380,000 30 
1990 Palestinian (from Kuwait and Gulf countries) 3,170,000 300,000 9,5 
2003 Iraqi 5,164,000 750,000 14,5 
2011 Syrian 6,508,271 1500 0,02 
2012 Syrian 6,508,887 230,000 3,1 
2013 Syrian 6,508,887 405,500 6,3 
                                                 
16
 National Committees for Research Ethics in Norway, Guidelines, 12. 
17
 Elisabeth Ådnegard, “Impacts of the Syrian Refugee Influx on the Jordanian Labor Market: Who are the 
Syrians Replacing – Jordanians or Egyptians?”, Report for the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Amman and the 
University of Oslo, December 2013, 14; Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host 
Governments to Mass Refugee Influx”, International Migration Review vol.30  no.3 (Autumn 1996), 655-678; 
655-657; Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Jordan : 
Palestinians (2008): http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cfcc.html, accessed 26.11.13.   
18
 Dr. Khalid al-Wazani, “al-athar al-iqtisaadiyya wa al-ijtima’iyya li-azma al-laaji’iin as-suriyyiin ‘ala al-
iqtisaad al-urdun”,   
(يندرلأا داصتقلاا ىلع نييروسلا نيئجلالا ةمزلأ ةيعامتجلااو ةيداصتقلاا راثلآا) , Issnaad Consulting, November 2012, 33. Data 
for 2013 is collected from UNHCR (UNHCR, ”Syrian Refugees in Jordan – Daily Update 16.01.13” and ”Inter-
Agency Regional Response for Syrian Refugees, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey 17-23 January”: 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=53&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Country%5B
%5D=107#page-53, accessed 21.04.14). 
7 
 
Since the Palestinian exodus of 1948, migration to and from Jordan has played a key 
role in Jordanian politics, economy, and society. Although most Palestinians are integrated 
and have Jordanian citizenship, they are still considered refugees with a right to return to their 
homeland.
19
 In 1970 as a direct consequence of the Palestinian refugee influx, civil war broke 
out in Jordan between the Jordanian government and the radicalized factions of the refugees, 
known as the fedayeen.
20
 Jordanian policy toward the refugees made it possible for them to 
organize themselves politically and create a “state within the state” or a “state-in-exile” in the 
refugee camps and the ghettos of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who resided in 
Jordan. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the formal name of the organized 
fedayeen, had taken over large areas in Jordan where they trained their own fighters in 
addition to providing education and welfare for its own refugee population. Radicalized 
groups from the camps carried out cross border attacks into Israel and threatened the 
Kingdom’s security. The Jordanian government had to take measures, leading to the civil war 
known as Black September.
21
 
 The latest refugee influx to Jordan came in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq which 
reportedly drove 750,000 Iraqis to seek refuge in the Kingdom.
22
 Many of these refugees were 
wealthy and could to a large extent rely on themselves without need for direct support from 
the state or international institutions.
23
 Similar to the current Syrian refugee influx, the 
majority of the Iraqi refugees did not live in organized camps and consequently affected the 
areas where they settled, mainly the capital. However, the Iraqis did not seek work in big 
numbers, but rather created work opportunities by investing and establishing companies. The 
Iraqis who had money were granted a residence permit lasting for one year at the time, with 
possibilities for extension as long as a considerable amount of money was left as guarantee in 
a Jordanian bank.
24
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As opposed to the different Palestinian influxes, the Syrian influx can be compared to 
the Iraqi influx in both numbers and the fact that the majority live outside camps. The 
demographic composition of the refugees and their impact on the society has proven to be 
quite different however. No two refugee influxes are the same and responses will necessarily 
vary.  
 
Short introduction to current Jordanian economy 
Jordan is one of the most open economies in the Middle East and is well integrated with its 
neighboring countries through trade, investments, and tourism. As a result of the open 
economy, the regional integration and its geographical location, Jordan is highly vulnerable to 
the political, economic, and social volatility in the region.
25
 Exogenous shocks following the 
Arab Spring such as sabotage on the gas pipeline in Sinai and decline in tourism and foreign 
investments have affected the country severely. The social impacts of these shocks were 
mitigated by external grants and higher food and energy subsidies, a targeted wage increase 
and social spending – which inherently caused the budget deficit to grow even higher.26  
Jordan’s economical problems were so severe they had to accept a 2 billion (bn) dollar 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in 2012. The IMF loan was granted on the basis of a 
fiscal plan to reduce public sector financing needs and lower public debt, carefully balanced 
against the risk of a recession and social acceptance. Nevertheless, protests and 
demonstrations erupted when Government of Jordan (GoJ) cut subsidies in late 2012.
27
 
Everyone on Jordanian soil enjoys the subsidies provided by GoJ, and cuts in subsidies are 
essential to get the Jordanian economy back on track, especially after the massive increase in 
population due to the refugee influx. With further cuts in subsidies however, demonstrations 
could easily re-erupt. 
There is no doubt that the Syrian refugee influx has had economic consequences for 
Jordan. A 10 percent increase in population has had a tremendous impact on Jordan’s 
infrastructure draining on scarce resources, already poor education, and health systems, as 
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well as the labor market.
28
 However, it is important to mention that the refugee influx also has 
benefitted the receiving country. According to Dr. Khalid al-Wazani, Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and chairman at Issnad Consulting, the Syrians contributed with almost 2,8bn 
Jordanian dinars (JOD) to the economy in 2013, mainly due to revenue from sales taxes. 
Additionally, investments related to the Syrian crisis, both by international and Syrian 
investors, created about 200,000 jobs. Dr. Khalid al-Wazani argued, on the other hand, that 
these benefits, of around 3,1 bn JOD, do not outweigh the burden for GoJ amounting to no 
less than an estimated 4,6 bn JOD.
 29
 Other positive economic impacts are the flow of donor 
money into the Jordanian economy and international goodwill to the receiving country, 
encouraging, for example, IMF to ease their demands for austerity measures following the 
loan granted in 2012. 
Several sources have expressed that the Syrian crisis came as a gift package from 
above to Jordan which, prior to the flow of humanitarian money and donor support, was on 
the edge of a crisis with a public debt constituting almost 70 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) and a public deficit of – 6, 2 per cent in 2011.30 
 
Level of tension and violence 
There have been, and still are, tensions in Jordan relating to political reform and economic 
issues as well as the presence of the refugees. 9,000 marches, demonstrations, strikes, rallies 
and sit-ins between January 2011 and spring 2013 makes this period one of the most 
contentious in Jordan’s history.31 When the Jordanian Arab Spring started in 2011, the 
demonstrators had some of the same demands as Syria’s protest movements. Nevertheless, 
Jordan is different; the protesters called mainly for reform, not the downfall of the regime.
32
 
The cause that gathered the largest protesters were cuts in subsidies for oil and food in late 
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2012. Regional violence and chaos have seemingly taken the steam out of the protest 
movements as stability trumps concerns over the economy these days. 
33
 
The number of rallies and sit-ins in support of reform in Amman and other 
governorates has decreased since late 2012. In a survey of Jordan Public Opinion from 
December 2013 carried out by International Republican Institute, the two largest groups of 
respondents (a total of 46 percent of those questioned) answered they didn’t know why the 
protests stopped or they were not convinced of the effectiveness of protests, and they gave up 
as the protests produced little benefits. 12 percent feared that Jordan would follow the path of 
neighboring countries.
34
  
The Jordanians fear they will become a minority in their own country if Jordan 
pursues the same refugee policy with open borders. Accordingly one man went as far as to say 
that he didn’t want his Jordanian ID card as it was no use for him if he becomes a refugee 
without rights in his own country competing over limited resources.
35
 Jordanians without 
health insurance, for example, are deeply frustrated that refugees have better access to free 
health care than they have.
36
 Several Jordanians also fear for their own security in border 
areas when the fighting on the other side of the border is getting to close, blaming the Syrians 
for bringing the war with them.
37
 Consequently, a majority of the Jordanians want to close the 
borders to the Syrian refugees or at least limit the number. In a survey conducted by the 
International Republican Institute in the beginning of December 2013, 43 percent of the 
questioned agreed to close the borders in the face of more Syrian refugees and 32 percent 
agreed to continue to receive Syrian refugees, but limit the number. Only 23 percent wished to 
continue to receive more Syrian refugees, while 3 percent answered they were not sure or did 
not know.
38
 Security struggles among Syrian refugees themselves have appeared in the form 
of fear and rumors of Syrian Regime members, disguised as refugees, suspected of attempts to 
destabilize Jordan and create tension between the refugees.
 39
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Tensions between Jordanians and their Syrian “guests” are growing as the crisis persists. 
Initially, Jordanians were opening their houses to their Syrian “brothers”, but their sympathy 
for the refugees is weakening as hardship is growing.
40
 The prolonged Syrian presence has 
served to focus on and help give voice to old grievances. An elderly woman in Mafraq 
acknowledged that there were problems before the Syrians came. No doubt they made the 
conditions worse, but it is also very easy just to put the blame on them.
41
 Reportedly, the 
nature of the tensions between the refugees and the host communities has changed since the 
early phases of the crisis. Initially centered on a lack of resources and economic opportunities, 
the tensions – at least in Mafraq – “have later transformed into a struggle over identity, 
territory and even security”.  
* * * 
In the following chapter, different theories relating to the consequences of a massive refugee 
influx will be presented. The first part of the chapter introduces the academic debate 
concerning consequences of refugee influxes whether they are political instability, economic 
growth or status quo. In the second part three theoretical explanations for stability despite a 
massive refugee influx are presented. These are finally narrowed down to three hypotheses 
that lay the foundation for the empirical analysis in the third chapter. 
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2. Theoretical background – Refugee influxes: 
consequences and possible explanations. 
 
There has been done a great deal of research on the consequences of massive refugee influxes 
on receiving countries focusing on the spread of conflict from the neighboring sending 
country.  Most of the studies gather empirical evidence from refugee experiences in Sub-
Saharan and Central Africa, with typical case studies such as Rwanda, Tanzania and Congo 
(Zaire).
42
 Despite the continuous incidents occurring in the Middle East resulting in millions 
of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), not very many of the works employ 
empirical data from this particular region. However, there has been a recent upward trend of 
studies using empirical evidence from the Middle East.
43
 This will likely continue because of 
the situation in the region today – in particular the Syrian conflict which has caused the worst 
refugee crisis since the genocide in Rwanda 20 years ago.
44
 International humanitarian 
organizations are calling for academic studies and assessments in order to make out the best 
strategy for coping with the increase in refugees in Syria’s neighboring countries as the crisis 
drags on.  
 
Political instability, economic growth or status quo? 
It is a well-established fact that refugees impose a variety of security, economic and 
environmental burdens on receiving countries. Most analyses concentrate on cases where 
conflict already had spilled over from the sending country and do not consider cases with a 
non-violent outcome. However, not only negative consequences follow a massive refugee 
influx. There may also be a significant flow of resources in the form of humanitarian 
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assistance, economic assets and human capital leading to increased prosperity for the 
receiving country – or it might not cause major societal or socio-economic change affecting 
the altering the country’s stability.45 
 
Political Instability  
Refugee movements are generally the result of conflict, but can also be a cause of conflict. It 
is widely accepted that refugee influxes can place considerable stress on natural resources, 
leading to both environmental and social impacts.
46
 Ragnhild Ek and Ahmed Kardawi (1991) 
present the case of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Sudan in the period 1969-1985 where 
the Sudanese perceived the refugees to pose a huge strain on the fragile Sudanese economy, 
infrastructure and environment. The refugees arrived at a time when the country was facing 
political unrest and different levels of conflict.  Consequently the refugees were increasingly 
blamed for the growing hardships. The refugees had become too many and they had stayed 
for too long according to their Sudanese hosts. The Second Sudanese civil war erupting in 
1983 was not a direct consequence of the presence of the refugees. Nevertheless, the influx is 
likely to have been adding to the tensions as the refugees were blamed for the deteriorating 
economic conditions while the government was accused for prioritizing the refugees over the 
nationals. Adding to this, the demographic composition of the refugees caused disturbance to 
the ethnical and ideological balance in the country changing the political scene.
47
 
Optimal conditions for growing tension and spread of conflict include a low state 
capability or willingness to provide security along the borders and the refugee camps.
48
 
Border control is very important facing a refugee crisis, both to prevent the spread of conflict 
from the sending country directly, but also to make sure that the receiving country doesn’t let 
in more refugees than its population and resources can handle. Without the capability or 
willingness to provide security, there could easily be tension. Attacks between the sending 
state and refugees – for example cross-border attacks – are likely to happen more frequently if 
security measures are not sufficient. Attacks between the host state and refugees – with Black 
September as a very extreme example – are as history shows, not unlikely if security 
measures are insufficient. Ethnic violence between refugees and locals could easily break out 
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if the country’s ethnic balance is being disturbed. Even inter-state war could be a result if the 
state government doesn’t prevent the refugees from mobilizing and militarizing, resulting in 
attacks and reprisal attacks from the sending state.
 49
 Hence, security is essential for 
preventing instability and conflict. However, as will be elaborated below, security measures 
that are too extreme can also lead to tensions.   
In some cases, as Sarah Kenyon Lischer explains, refugees can possibly become more 
prone to violence over time – especially for long-term refugees who initially wished to return 
as soon as possible, but see no hope of return until radical change occurs in their homeland. 
As time passes, leadership among the refugees may emerge that unites the refugees behind a 
program of political and military action. This might happen in Syria’s neighboring countries 
as a result of the seemingly “never-ending” conflict and the resulting displaced persons in the 
region.
50
 
 
Economic growth 
In several of her research papers, Karen Jacobsen states that when refugees are permitted to 
work alongside their hosts to pursue livelihood, they would be less dependent on aid and 
better able to overcome the sources of tension and conflict in their host communities.
51
 In 
other words, correct handling of the refugee influx can, combined with a convenient 
demographic combination of refugees, be beneficial for the host state. The tendency to store 
refugees in camps and the failure to look for more creative and positive approaches to “never-
ending” refugee situations could be a real waste of resources. The camp approach fails to 
recognize how refugees can contribute to the economic vitality and to the human security of 
the host communities if allowed to pursue their livelihood.
52
  
Host governments normally resist programs which enable the refugees to pursue their 
livelihood as they prefer refugees to go home after a short period. Short-term solutions such 
as relief aid are, however, expensive in the long run. In due course, it is also more likely to 
lead to passivity, dependency, and frustration.
53
 Beth Elise Whitaker shows an example from 
Tanzania where nearly 600,000 refugees from Rwanda was settled in a dozen camps along the 
border. The rural hinterlands were transformed into sprawling cities and “sleepy towns” 
became headquarters for hi-tech operations due to the refugees and the international 
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humanitarian presence. Even though there was an increase in crime, environmental 
degradation and inflation which caused resentment among Tanzanian hosts, it did not threaten 
the overall stability of the country.  
One problem that can appear when refugees are allowed to engage in economic 
activity is if the refugees turn out to be more productive than locals, for example when they as 
farmers are able to put the land to better use and profit from their labor.
54
 The effect of 
refugees’ increased economic resources on the relation with the host community can go both 
ways; it could lead to increased resentment by the host community; but, on the other hand, it 
could lead to increased willingness to socialize and deal with the refugees.
55
 
 
Status quo 
A massive refugee influx can also have minor implications and consequently no conflict 
appear, maybe against all odds.
56
 The Iraqi refugee influx to Syria last decade can serve as an 
example of this. At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, especially after the bombings of the 
Samara Mosque in 2006, it is estimated that Syria hosted up to 1.5 million Iraqis. 
Nevertheless, this massive refugee influx did not lead to any massive tension or conflict 
between the Syrian hosts and their Iraqi guests, despite the historical hostility between the two 
people, scarce resources, and subsidized goods available for refugees, growing budget deficit, 
increasing rent, and high unemployment among other factors.
 57
  
Reinoud Leenders (2008) found that spillover of the Iraqi conflict is not very likely 
due to the refugees’ demographic composition and also the fact that they escaped the violence 
to avoid fighting. Highly educated refugees with a majority of elderly, women and children 
who did not participate in the violence before the crisis are less likely to engage in violence in 
the receiving country. However, Leenders argues, tension and conflict should, nonetheless, 
not be written off, especially if the conflict persists. Socio-economic destitution and the 
failure to provide humanitarian assistance were already the cause of tensions between Iraqi 
refugees, the receiving state, and host communities and would likely continue to be. 
However, as is known today, the Iraqi influx did not cause severe tension or conflict 
despite the seething discontent among their Syrian hosts.
58
 It could be argued that the refugee 
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crisis did not unfold properly and that there might have been a different outcome if the Middle 
East didn’t have the Arab Spring three years later in 2011. Nevertheless, the situation has 
several similarities to the situation Jordan is witnessing today.  
 
Possible explanations for the lack of destabilization 
In the next chapter, three hypotheses will be tested in an empirical analysis. Before deducing 
the three hypotheses from the existing theory, it is necessary to elaborate three explanations 
that guide the understanding of Jordan’s refugee situation today as these are among the 
leading explanations in the field used for analyzing stability and the consequences of refugee 
influxes. The first is that the “Middle Eastern monarchy” is inherently stable. The second is 
that there have to be a balance between security measures and freedom for the refugees in the 
government’s response to the refugees. Finally, there is the hypothesis about the stabilizing 
effect of a particular demographic composition within the refugee population. 
 
Monarchy as inherently stable  
What explains the variation in political stability in the Middle East? One point that is 
frequently mentioned by the media and scholars is regime type. Scholars have for a long time 
hypothesized Middle Eastern monarchies as being distinct from other authoritarian regimes.
59
 
A monarchy is a regime led by a hereditary sovereign who may hold varying degrees of 
power. In the Middle East today, there are eight Arab monarchies: Jordan, Morocco, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and UAE. These monarchies are not identical to, for 
example, the Norwegian and British monarchies which are constitutional kingships. In the 
Middle East, the kings and emirs “not only reign, but rule”.60 During the Arab Spring, Middle 
Eastern republics have fallen like dominos, but the monarchies on the other hand stand firm. 
This corresponds with the many theories on “monarchical exceptionalism”. That the Middle 
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Eastern monarchies are more resilient and less likely to fall than the republics is almost a fait 
accompli among scholars of the region.
61
  
Not only have the monarchies survived the Arab Spring, but they have also proved to 
be more resilient over time. Since King Abdullah I was proclaimed king of Jordan in 1946, 
the Hashemite family has ruled the Kingdom.
62
 Jordan has faced internal and external 
challenges similar to the region’s republics. The Arab Republic of Syria, for example, 
witnessed a turbulent period with a succession of coups starting from 1949 until Hafiz al-
Asad gained control over the different fractions in the early 1970s.
63
 In the 1950s and 1960s, 
Jordan went through a turbulent period were the Kingdom’s rule was challenged both 
internally and externally, culminating in the event of Black September in 1970. However, 
unlike the Syrian republic, the Jordanian monarchy survived and the ruling family has not 
changed since the creation of the Kingdom 68 years ago.
64
  
The most common arguments used to explain the inherent stability of the monarchies 
are cultural and institutional. According to the cultural arguments, Arab monarchies enjoy 
more legitimacy than the republics since the monarchical rule is considered traditional and 
claimed to be based on tribal social structure and Islam. Hence, a lower degree of repression 
is needed. The institutional arguments explain the monarchies resilience as a result of the 
monarch’s high esteemed position in the society which allows him to more easily retain the 
support of existing elites while at the same time engage in processes of modernization in 
response to popular pressure. By appealing directly to the masses, a king can calm opposition 
and prevent further unrest with promises of change due to his unique position. This is more 
difficult to do for republican dictators who constantly have to please their vital cadres.
65
  
Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III (2012) argue that these explanations are 
inadequate. They state that the absence of revolution cannot be reasoned from the mere 
presence of legitimacy, because this would have to mean that every regime must be legitimate 
unless it is overthrown. Regarding the institutional explanation, they argue that kings as well 
as authoritarians pursue policies that they hope will keep them in power. If the monarchial 
institutionalism was exceptionally good, why wouldn’t the dictators of the republics take the 
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same measures?
66
 The authors instead give what they call a “strategic” explanation to what 
makes monarchies more stable. First, broad-based, cross-cutting coalitions are important for 
autocracies regardless of institutional structure. Second, oil rents or recirculated oil rents from 
neighboring countries in the form of aid are used as inducements for regime supporters. 
Finally, foreign patrons help with diplomatic, economic, and military support during crisis. 
This could help explain Jordan’s stability against all odds and the hypothesis will be tested in 
the empirical analysis in the next chapter.
67
 Moreover, the three criteria in Yom and Gause’s 
strategic explanation about monarchy stability are also applicable to other regime types. This 
hypothesis will be referred to as “economic and foreign policy as determinants” as this is the 
leitmotif of the hypothesis.  
 
Strategies and responses to the refugee influx  
The choices made by host governments about how to respond to a refugee influx must be 
highly weighed with many factors in mind. Security politics, refugees’ rights, as well as 
citizens’ rights are definitely factors that should be intertwined in such decision-making. 
Security and stability are often of high priority. Border control, efficient intelligence, and 
police services are essential for a state to provide safety for the refugees and its citizens as 
mentioned above, in addition to prevent destabilization as a consequence of the conflict next 
door.  
As Karen Jacobsen has shown, several host governments choose to gather refugees in 
camps due to security issues. In camps, refugees can be assisted and managed by international 
refugee agencies, the impact on the society of the receiving country would be minimal, and 
the host government would have to worry to a much lesser extent about refugees competing 
with locals for scarce resources such as land, jobs and environmental recourses, as well as the 
exhaustion of existing resources such as schools, housing and health facilities. However, one 
of the most obvious dilemmas in the camps is that the more control, security, and surveillance 
utilized, the more frustration and less integration felt among the refugees. In a protracted 
crisis, the end result is a non-participating, passive refugee population. Jacobsen argues that 
security can be achieved in a different way, by utilizing refugee resources. Letting the 
refugees settle and pursue their life in host communities will, according to Jacobsen, increase 
the welfare of the host community in two ways. First, international refugee assistance will 
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“trickle out” into the communities, and second, the economic activities of refugees will 
contribute to the host community’s standards of living.68 Whether the government strategy is 
to gather refugees in camps or not is essential in this matter. 
Previous literature has shown that letting refugees pursue livelihood by being granted 
access to resources, freedom of movement, and employment, they would be less dependent on 
aid and better able to overcome the sources of tension and conflict in their host 
communities.
69
 However, the literature has also shown that giving the refugees too much 
space could possibly come at the expense of the local communities, especially the working 
poor.
70
 In the process of providing livelihood opportunities for the refugees, care must be 
taken to ensure that security problems are being addressed. Jacobsen highlights three concerns 
in particular. First, she mentions the importance of an inclusive approach. It must be ensured 
that the programs and interventions address the needs of the affected host community as well 
as the refugees. Programs that involve and include both groups are more likely to be 
embraced by everyone in the host communities and are more likely to succeed.  Secondly, 
humanitarian agencies must recognize existence of illicit activities that both displaced and 
local rely on.
71
 The most common example of this is that many refugees work in the informal 
market, depressing down wages to a low inacceptable to locals as they are not getting the 
same support and aid as the refugees.
72
 This could lead to tension between locals and 
refugees. Finally, donors must advocate with host governments to allow refugees to pursue 
livelihoods in host communities, not only in camps, so these communities can benefit from 
the international aid as well.
73
  
For the relief and development organizations handling a refugee crisis, the question is 
not necessarily how best to help refugees alone, but how to find solutions that are also 
acceptable to host countries. For receiving states, the number one priority tends to be security 
and stabilization. Without the receiving country’s acceptance and active involvement, it will 
be much more difficult to help refugees.
74
 Regardless of the amount of pressure from the 
international society, the receiving country is a sovereign state and has the final word. It is the 
government that has the final say when it comes to security measures, whether to gather the 
refugees in camps and whether to allow the refugees to pursue livelihood. This second 
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hypothesis – “institutional capacity as determinant” – will be discussed empirically in the next 
chapter. 
 
Demographic composition of the refugees  
Another factor that could help explain the lack of severe tensions in a receiving country is the 
demographic, social, and political composition of the refugee influx.  As mentioned above, 
Reinoud Leenders finds that the demographic composition of the refugee influx can explain 
the low level of violence between the Syrian host communities and the Iraqi refugees, among 
refugees, and among the refugees and the state.  
In his case study, Leenders looks at the Iraqi refugees’ propensity for violence, and 
argues that the composition of the social and political characteristics of the refugees better 
explains why they have not facilitated a spillover from conflict to the extent some had 
expected. According to Leenders, the fact that the Syrian government imposed tight 
surveillance and hard restrictions on the refugees together with the demographic composition 
of the Iraqi refugee population not typical of political radicalization and violence explain the 
lack of destabilization. First of all, women, children and elderly were disproportionally 
represented among the refugees, and the number of men in “fighting age” was few compared 
to the rest. There were also a disproportional share of academics and well educated 
professionals among the Iraqi refugees in Syria who, similar to women, children, and elderly 
are less likely to engage in violence and radicalization. Most of the Iraqi refugees did not 
participate in the conflict prior to their exile and they almost unanimously expressed a strong 
tiredness of the whole conflict with no intention to participate in it, equally disappointed in all 
political parties and fractions involved.
75
  
Beth Elise Whitaker presents a similar finding when comparing the cases of Rwandan 
refugees in Tanzania and Congo, where in the last mentioned case the influx led to massive 
destabilization while in the first it did not. The composition of the refugees was emphasized in 
those cases; there were more politically active individuals from the previous government 
among the refugees in Congo.
76
 This corresponds with Sarah Kenyon Lischer’s theory that 
“situational refugees” are unlikely to have the propensity for violence as compared to her two 
other categories of refugees: “persecuted refugees” and “state-in-exile refugees”. 77 Lischer 
defines “situational refugees” as refugees who fled their homes due to war, chaos, and 
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deprivation with a wish to return as soon as there is peace and stability. They have none or 
very loose initial political organization. In sharp contrast to the other categories of refugees, 
the “situational refugees” will return to their homes regardless of the outcome of the conflict 
as long as the hostilities come to an end. In the receiving country, the goals of these refugees 
are to pursuit their livelihood and return to their previous life as much as possible.
78
  
In other words, characteristics of a refugee population such as a disproportionate 
distribution of children, women, and elderly; high level of education and/or wealth, and what 
Lischer defined as “situational refugees” are all possible stabilizing factors for a receiving 
country. “Demographic composition as determinant” is the third and final hypothesis that will 
be used in the empirical analysis below.   
 
Conclusion  
No refugee influx is the same, and the response of the receiving country also varies. Rather 
than expecting that refugees will spread conflict, it is important to analyze the dynamics in 
play and in Jordan’s case the reasons for the lasting stability, in an effort to prevent 
destabilization. Out of the persisting theory, three hypotheses have been deducted: “economic 
and foreign policy as determinants” focusing on foreign aid and the importance and usage of 
“foreign rents”; “institutional capacity as determinant” dealing with the handling of the 
refugee influx; and “demographic composition as determinant” looking into the demographic 
composition of the Syrian refugees in Jordan. These hypotheses will be examined in the 
following chapter. 
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3. What kept Jordan stable? 
 
Jordan, a country that is already struggling with political unrest, scarce resources and a 
growing public deficit, has upheld its stability despite the immense impact of the refugee 
influx from Syria. Jordan’s geographical position and the fact that Jordan’s “superpower 
friends” don’t want to see Jordan fall, are important to understanding the Kingdom’s stability 
in a troubled region. Stability is naturally GoJ’s highest priority and all decisions are based on 
this. The demographic composition of the Syrian refugees in Jordan can also be considered a 
stabilizing factor, but only in the short-term. Should the refugees lose their hope of returning 
to their homes due to the protracted crisis, the situation could change rapidly, especially if the 
government does not allow refugees to pursue livelihood and start a new life for fear that this 
would have negative impacts on its own citizens. In situations where destabilization can be 
expected as a consequence of a refugee influx, such as Jordan, the host government and the 
international community must work together in order to protect the refugees, but at the same 
time address the challenges and underlying seeds of conflict in the receiving country to 
prevent destabilization.
79
  The previous chapter presented the theoretical debate concerning 
refugees and the spread of conflict and deducted three hypotheses that lay the foundation for 
the empirical analysis that follows: “economy and foreign policy as determinants”, 
“institutional capacity as determinant” and “demographical composition as determinant”. 
 
Economy and foreign policy as determinants 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, the inherent stability of the Middle Eastern monarchies 
is generally accepted as a theory, but explanations vary as to why. Yom and Gause’s 
“strategic” explanation will be used to explain the Kingdom’s stability. As argued in the 
previous chapter, this hypothesis is equally relevant for other regime types and is therefore not 
referred to as the monarchical hypothesis, but rather the “economic and foreign policy as 
determinant” hypothesis. The following table shows the findings regarding this first 
hypothesis: 
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Table 2 Economy and foreign policy as determinants for stability 
Present in 
Jordan 
Broad-based coalitions Oil-/strategic rents Patrons 
Yes  X  
(recirculated oil rents from 
GCC) 
X  
(US, Saudi 
Arabia) 
No X  
(but broad-based, cross cutting coalition for 
stability) 
  
 
Broad-based, cross-cutting coalitions 
Supporters are crucial for a regime as it is impossible to rule through repression alone. A 
regime relying on a broad-based, cross-cutting coalition will naturally enjoy a larger degree of 
legitimacy and trust from the people. A regime that manages to link different social 
constituencies to the ruling family has a better chance of success than regimes with only one 
foothold.
80
 The power base of the Hashemite Kingdom has traditionally been the Jordanian 
Bedouins, known as East Bankers.
81
  East Bankers have historically been patronized through a 
social contract consisting of generous welfare benefits and privileged access to state jobs. 
With time, however, Palestinian businessmen have become a part of the authoritarian contract 
receiving economic benefits in return for political support, thus creating a broader power base 
for the regime.
82
 However, as the Syrian refugees increasingly strain the Jordanian economy, 
the old patronage systems that ensured tribal and Palestinian businessmen’s loyalty to the 
monarchy are negatively affected.
83
  
Tribes and townships increasingly blame the government and local municipalities for 
not doing enough to help the areas that have borne the biggest burden from the refugee influx. 
The East Bankers’ frustration with the GoJ was striking at a workshop in Amman, where the 
cost-benefit framework of the socio-economic implications of the Syrian refugees on the 
Jordanian economy was discussed. The majority of the participants were East Bank 
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government officials from the northern governorates. One by one they criticized the GoJ for 
leaving the municipalities with the bill for the Syrian refugees.
84
 The old power base is also 
protesting against the loss of traditional economic privileges as a result of the IMF austerity 
measures.
85
 Should the economic strain brought on the East Bankers continue, the relationship 
between the monarchy and its old powerbase is likely to deteriorate.  
In early 2013 a tribal based opposition movement attracted hundreds of angry Bedouin 
– originally the monarchy’s traditional power base. The movement’s popularity cooled off 
quickly, and in November the same year, the protest movement drew no more than fifty 
demonstrators due to protest fatigue, intelligence infiltrations, and imprisonment of leaders.
86
 
Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction is still alluring and a consequence of the East Bankers’ 
decreasing reliance on GoJ is increased tribal importance. Where the state has failed to 
provide benefits and privileges for its supporters, tribal affiliation has become more important 
in order to maneuver within the Jordanian bureaucracy. According to a government official 
who left his position at a ministry for this reason, “the ministries’ hallways are filled with 
tribe members of the different ministers not lobbying, but claiming their interests”. He 
complained that no one listened to qualified, reasoned arguments for decision-making: “They 
only listen to the voice of the tribe”.87  
Hence, the broader based coalition that barely existed is being challenged, and so is 
the traditional deal between the old power base and the monarchy. For the moment it seems 
like the broad-based, cross-cutting coalition is voting for stability rather than any political 
regime in particular – fearing that Jordan could end up like its neighbors; Syria and Iraq.88 
 
Recirculated oil rents from neighboring countries 
“Loyalty has a price and everybody knows this”.89 The cost of buying broad-based, cross-
cutting coalitions through public paid jobs and subsidies is not cheap. The Gulf States use oil 
rents in order to create a broad-based coalition by distributing goods and services to the 
people. By not using the people’s taxes to pay for a broad-based, cross cutting coalition, this 
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strategy makes it possible for the regimes to be less accountable to their people.
90
 Jordan does 
not have a significant amount of natural resources that can provide rent. The main resource 
base centers on phosphate and potash and in 2011 natural resources accounted for 2.8 percent 
of Jordan’s GDP.91 Still, the Hashemite monarchy uses rents to finance its coalition – 
recirculated rents or strategic rents as it also could be called. Due to the amount of the 
strategic rent Jordan receives, it might be considered a ‘semi-rentier’ state, a state in which 
rulers share out a significant portion of state income to the population in hope of securing 
their loyalty.
92
  
Due to Jordan’s geographical position, sandwiched between Syria, Iraq and Israel, 
rents have poured into the country for years – not only from its western allies, but also from 
the Gulf countries.
93
 During the past years the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has 
transformed from being an alliance organized around external security into one focused on 
domestic stability. Through recirculated oil rents in the forms of grants, cheap loans, and 
‘Foreign Direct Investment’ (FDI), the Gulf countries help their fellow monarchy Jordan to 
alleviate the impact of potential economic and political unrest.
94
 It has been reported that 
Jordan in 2014 will increase its state expenditure by 12.8 percent to spur its economy, 
spending from a $5bn fund allocated from oil rich Gulf states.
95
  
The money allocated to Jordan to alleviate unrest makes it possible for the regime to 
expand public employment and costly subsidies as a reaction to demonstrations, thus 
preventing destabilization in the Kingdom.
96
 However, it is widely suspected that Gulf money 
doesn’t come without attachments and is therefore not necessarily solely a stabilizing factor. 
As Samuel and Tally Helfont, Phd. candidate and research fellow respectively, for Foreign 
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Policy Research Institute (2012) claim, the GCC support presents “a social contract whereby 
the state ensures stability and economic success, but, in exchange, the people forego political 
rights”. This does not coincide with the wish of the majority of the Jordanian opposition, nor 
the will of the country’s long time patron: the United States of America.97 Whether the 
Jordanian people prefer stability and bread before political freedom remains to be seen. 
Reform has been encouraged and supported publicly by the GCC countries, but the 
GCC supports the political status quo in Jordan because the “monarchy club” fears that if one 
monarchy falls, the rest will follow like dominos. Their strategy is for Jordan to reduce the 
budget deficit by spending strategic rents while admitting to limited reforms without granting 
any real political liberalization. By doing this, the King is likely to remain in position, and the 
monarchies of the Middle East will not feel threatened.
98
 
 
Foreign patron(s)  
In times of trouble, Jordan could also turn to its foreign patrons for support. Since the Cold 
War, when the Kingdom chose a pro-Western policy position, the US has stood by its ally for 
better and for worse. The US has long regarded Jordan one of its closest Middle Eastern 
allies. Now, it could be said that Jordan is the last guaranteed American foothold in the 
region.
99
 Saudi Arabia has for years supported Jordan with a substantial amount of money and 
must also be considered a patron. 
Over the years, the level of aid from the US to Jordan has varied, increasing in 
response to threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during periods with political differences or 
reductions of aid worldwide.
100
 However, in 2011 the US Congress affirmed that given 
Jordan’s strategic value, the economic support will remain steady despite domestic pressure to 
cut foreign aid.
101
 Since 2008, Jordan has received $660 million a year in accordance with a 
five year memorandum of understanding (MoU) that expires in 2014. $360 million is 
considered economic support, and $300 million is earmarked for military assistance. In 
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addition to this, the Congress allocated another $340 million to Jordan through overseas 
contingency funds. The US President Barak Obama announced in February 2014 that he 
would renew an agreement ensuring a minimum level of US aid as the Kingdom copes with 
the inflow of Syrian refugees.
102
 With this money, the Hashemite regime is able to continue to 
integrate the patronage of the East Bankers into its power balance by underwriting public 
sector employment and state investments.
103
 
The Kingdom’s second patron, Saudi Arabia, is also interested in keeping Jordan 
stable, but their strategy is slightly different from the US strategy. First of all, Saudi Arabian 
aid is not as predictable as the American aid. For example, Saudi has not entered into a MoU 
or other agreements regarding minimum or maximum annual aid. Nor is there any account of 
the amount of aid allocated from Saudi Arabia available in open sources. Private transfers to 
the Jordanian leadership make it difficult to estimate the size of Saudi support. The aid from 
Saudi is sometimes large but often erratic and unpredictable and the Saudis have been accused 
of using unpredictable support as a tool to shape Jordanian policies to Saudi interests. In 2011 
for example, Saudi Arabia granted $1bn to support Jordan’s economy and cover its budget 
deficit. In 2012 Jordan reportedly received no economic support from Saudi Arabia at all.
104
 
Then again in 2013, Saudi Arabia announced it would give Jordan $10bn to help it deal with 
the Syrian refugees. This happened the day after GoJ announced that Jordan would not accept 
Palestinian refugees from Syria blaming their refugee situation on Israel’s refusal to allow 
Palestinians into the West Bank or Israel. This type of rhetoric was highly appreciated by 
Saudi Arabia.
105
 
Through financial support, the US is pushing for increased political reform towards 
democracy in Jordan while Saudi Arabia is hoping that Jordan will adopt their view on 
political rights. The overall goal for the US and Saudi Arabia is the same: neither wish to see 
a destabilized Jordan, nor loose a stable and valuable ally. They simply just see different paths 
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toward ensuring the monarchy’s survival.106 Both countries’ need of Jordan as an ally seems 
to prove stronger than their political differences.  
 
Institutional capacity as determinant 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, security consideration tends to lay the foundation 
when host governments are to decide upon strategies for coping with massive refugee 
influxes. Three aspects relating to this will be discussed below: security measures, the use of 
refugee camps, and the issues related to the pursuit of livelihood for refugees. The following 
table shows the findings of the second hypothesis: 
Table 3: Institutional capacity as determinant for stability 
Present in 
Jordan 
Security willingness/capacity Accommodation in 
camps 
Pursuit of Livelihood 
Yes X  
(excellent intelligence, control of the 
370km border a challenge) 
  
No  X  
(not GoJ’s strategy 
so far) 
X 
(no legal rights regarding the 
pursuit of livelihood) 
 
Security willingness, or capacity. 
The Syrian crisis displays complex security challenges that compel the Kingdom to reinforce 
its security apparatus and adopt a harder line.
107
 In this context, it is important to keep in mind 
that security is not only essential for the survival of the regime, but also for the country’s 
capability to host refugees. A destabilized Jordan would be an even worse place for refugees 
than Jordan is today. The primary security measure is to control the border to Syria, 
preventing an uncontrolled flow of refugees, fighters and weapons. Nevertheless, border 
policy and security are complex issues. The international society has long accused Jordan of 
not keeping to the open border policy, but the GoJ denies the claim.
108
 Jordanian political 
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analyst Oraib al-Rantawi said already in September 2013 that “only one of ten [Syrian 
refugees] is permitted to enter Jordan from the airport – and there is no system to it. The same 
goes for the border in the north”.109 According to Syria Need Analysis Project’s (SNAP) 
Regional Analysis of Syria and neighboring countries, the number of daily arrivals to Jordan 
decreased considerably in 2013, from 1,700 to 300 in May, reportedly due to border 
restrictions.
110
 Nevertheless, it is hard to criticize a country which has accepted more than 
600,000 refugees over the past four years for implementing security measures regarding who 
is granted access to the Kingdom.   
To maintain control of the 370km long Jordanian-Syrian border is challenging and 
Jordan is struggling. Notwithstanding the numerous watchtowers and checkpoints set up by 
GoJ and the fighter planes constantly patrolling the border, illegal border activity increased in 
2013.
 111
 According to the commander of the Jordanian border guards, Brigadier General 
Hussein al-Zyoud, smuggling activity across the Jordanian-Syrian border last year increased 
by 300 percent.
112
 The only legal border crossing for refugees today, Bustana, is located 
remotely in the eastern desert, making it easier for Jordanian border guards to control the flow 
of refugees, but harder for refugees to access.
113
 Forcing the refugees to cross the eastern 
desert of Syria is clearly a measure to limit the refugee influx to the Kingdom. Nevertheless, it 
is impossible to limit border crossing to the Bustana checkpoint. According to Jordan Times 
(JT), as many as 1,625 Syrian refugees crossed the border into Jordan over 72 hours in late 
March 2014 trough illegal entry points.
114
 The crisis in Syria and the fear of spillover has led 
to a growing market for guns in the Kingdom and weapons are being smuggled both into and 
out of Jordan. The rate of illegal border crossings also rose last year by 250 percent.
 115
 
Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID)116, infamous in Jordan under the 
name Mukhabarat, is admired by professionals as a highly efficient and trustworthy 
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intelligence service and comparable to Israel’s renowned Mossad.117 When border control 
fails, GID has a reputation for waiting on the other side, following up on illegal border 
activity. This has been essential for the northern regions, especially Mafraq where 
government officials have reported on growing activity among “terrorist” sleeper cells funded 
by external actors.
118
 The arrest of a member of Syrian intelligence in disguise in Za’atari in 
March 2013 can serve as an example. One man was caught and captured with weapons and 
explosives, admitting to initiating rebel actions and burning down tents in the camp.
119
 
Apparently, he managed to avoid the border controls, but not the intelligence services. The 
Jordanian journalist Linda Maaia gave another example of the efforts by Jordanian 
authorities: A Jordanian citizen who had infiltrated Syria and fought with the al-Qaida linked 
Jabhat al-Nusra was sentenced in December 2013. After his stay in Syria, the man returned to 
Jordan with a Syrian identification card and entered the Za’atari camp as a refugee in June 
2013. Jordanian intelligence later somehow saw through his ruse and arrested him.
120
  
Obviously, it is not only Syrians entering the Kingdom that the mukhabarat is 
interested in. Similar to “the western world’s fears” of foreign fighters returning from the 
Syrian conflict with combat practice and ideological training, Jordan is afraid of the 
destabilizing effect of returning fighters. According to Islamist sources, more than 2,000 
Jordanians are fighting in Syria, with the majority of them under the umbrella of Jabhat al-
Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In November 2013 the JT reported that 
60 foreign fighters were arrested at the border and, in the past 6 months, 180 suspected 
Jordanian jihadists with ties to Syrian Islamists have been detained by Jordanian authorities. 
Arrests of foreign fighters and managing of the numbers of refugees entering the country are 
signs of a regime in control.
121
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Syrian refugees constitute now around 10 percent of the Jordanian population. 
Restrictions to the open border policy are not an unreasonable measure when seen from a 
security policy perspective. Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh explained the situation 
to an American audience using an example more familiar to the audience: Jordan accepting 
600,000 Syrian refugees is equivalent to if the US accepted the entire population of Canada as 
refugees.
122
 Despite pressure from donors and the international relief regime, the GoJ is still 
restricting the number of refugees crossing into Jordan. This proves that security and 
stabilization is prioritized over humanitarian principles and international recognition. 
Nevertheless, the GoJ is not in complete control of who crosses its 370km long border. 
Consequently people unwanted in the country always find a way in. This is, as discussed 
above, where the intelligence service comes into use.  
 
“Accommodation”: camps or not 
Despite the fact that no more than 20 percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan live in camps, it 
will be fruitful to discuss the strategies behind the choice of whether or not to gather refugees 
in camps. First of all, historically, it was the organization of the Palestinian refugee camps 
that mainly set the stage for the civil war in Jordan in 1970.
123
 Secondly, from a theoretical 
perspective, the organization of refugee camps, especially when located close to the border, 
have shown to be a push factor for destabilization for example in Kenya, Thailand, Tanzania, 
and Pakistan.
124
 Third, for a policy reason, as there might be a change in GoJ’s refugee 
response toward placing more refugees in camps due to increased focus on national security 
and stability. After being announced to open in August (2013), September (2013) and January 
(2014), a new refugee camp in Jordan was opened 30 April 2014.
125
 The Azraq camp, with a 
capacity to host 130,000, was finally opened reportedly due to the increase in the average 
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number of refugees crossing the border to around 600 per day.
126
 This new camp indicates a 
change in GoJ’s policy. 
Even though gathering refugees in camps is believed to shield the locals from the 
burdens of the refugee influx, it would not necessarily prove beneficial to the receiving state. 
As mentioned earlier, an obvious dilemma with camps is that the more control, security, and 
surveillance used, the more frustration and less integration among refugees making them 
difficult to control. Of the six Syrian refugee camps in Jordan, the largest and most renowned 
camp is the Za’atari camp located in Mafraq, hosting a little over 106,000 refugees.127 Za’atari 
has been through all stages of security, control and unrest since its opening. In spring 2013, 
the number of refugees in Za’atari increased from 123,000 to 171,000 in one month creating 
enormous pressures on the camp which ideally should host no more than 110,000 refugees.  
 Since then the there has been considerable less serious tension. This is a result of the 
decrease in number of refugees living in Za’atari through the year of 2013, but also due to 
measures taken both by UNHCR and GoJ to get the situation under control and grant the 
refugees more freedom.
128
 In November 2013 there were no more than 75,000 refugees 
residing in Za’atari, and in May 2014 there were according to UNHCR approximately 
100,000.
129
 The refugees enjoy a bigger role in the daily management of the camp and are 
able to pursue livelihood for themselves, for example, by working in the camps two 
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“supermarkets”, electricity services, administration to one of the twelve constructed 
municipalities, or patrolling as neighborhood watch trained by Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) 
and US Marines.
130
 The infrastructure has improved magnificently, and with a public address 
system and a shopping street called “Shams Elysees” it reminds one more of a city than a 
desert camp.
131
 According to UNHCRs camp manager Killian Kleinschmidt there has been an 
inflow to the camp lately as a result of the opportunity to work in addition to less top down 
security. “Compared to the host communities, the life in Za’atari is not that bad and the 
refugees see this!” 132 
Despite the improving conditions in Za’atari, there was a rare incident in the camp 5 
April 2014 killing one refugee and injuring 29 Jordanian Gendarmes and 3 refugees. JT 
reported the following day that, according to Jordanian officials, clashes erupted after 
Jordanian police stopped three families attempting to leave Za’atari illegally through a break 
in the fence and three other people who tried to sneak in. Those who got caught started 
shouting for help and around 200 Syrians gathered around them throwing rocks at the 
officials. The number of protesters swiftly increased to 5000, setting tents on fire and 
throwing Molotov cocktails. Camp residents, on the other hand, claim that the protest was 
provoked when a four year old Syrian child was knocked over by a Jordanian security car. 
This has not been confirmed. According to the authorities, who only fired tear gas, gunshots 
were heard from the protesting crowd, and it was a gunshot that killed the Syrian refugee.
133
  
This incident illustrates the changing situation of the refugee camp. First, this is the 
first serious disturbance this year. In fact, there hasn’t been such international media focus 
around any incidents of this size since spring last 2013.
134
 Secondly, the incident confirms 
that there are weapons available inside the camp. Director of the Department of Syrian 
Refugees in Jordan (DSRJ), Brigadier General (BG) Dr. Wadah al-Hamoud, stated that no 
guns were found the following day, but the camp would be thoroughly searched.
135
 And 
finally, refugees now, unlike earlier, are actively being prevented from leaving the camp. 
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Clampdowns on the bailout process and refugees being denied leaving are something 
humanitarian organizations have reported lately, but the GoJ has denied their claims. In 
November 2013 BG Dr. al-Hamoud said “no one is forced to stay in Za’atari”.136 There are no 
fences surrounding the Za’atari camp, and refugees have been known to exit and enter the 
camp as they like.
137
 However, BG Dr. al-Hamoud told the Saudi newspaper al-Hayat 
following the incident that the authorities fear a mass escape to outside the camp. According 
to him, this has started already and about 10 percent of the camp residents have managed to 
escape and there is a security plan to better control things inside the camp.  
Za’atari has not had seen the current stability since its opening, except from this most 
recent incident. It is interesting that what sparked this latest unrest was Jordanian security 
officials preventing refugees from entering and exiting the camp illegally, something the 
refugees were free to do according to the director of DRSJ in November 2013– but apparently 
not anymore.
138
 The GoJ’s fear of “sleeping cells” among the refugees working for the Syrian 
regime to destabilize the Kingdom is likely a reason for increased security measures.
139
 A 
tightening of the control in Za’atari, together with the opening of the Azraq camp could signal 
a desire from GoJ to gather more refugees in camps. Several of the government officials at a 
workshop in February 2014 on socio-economic impacts of the refugees recommended exactly 
this: that the refugees should all be put in camps.
140
 There might be a change in policy ahead, 
but until now, gathering refugees in camps has not been a part of GoJ’s security strategy. 
 
Pursuit of livelihood 
As mentioned above, gathering refugees in camps is a well used strategy by receiving states to 
reduce the negative impact of refugees and the burdens placed on host communities. 
However, it is also said that letting refugees pursue livelihood in many cases will have socio-
economic benefits for the host communities.
141
 The Syrian refugees bring with them a sizable 
amount of human capital that could be utilized to mitigate the costs of their presence and 
benefit the host communities. In a protracted refugee crisis, relief aid provided over a longer 
period to refugees living in host communities is unfortunate for two reasons in particular. 
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First, relief aid is building up under the divide between the guests and the hosts when the 
refugees get “free benefits” and the locals do not – regardless of their financial situation. 
Second, relief aid will, in the long-term, make recipients passive and it will benefit only parts 
of the society, such as owners of grocery shops and landowners due to increased consumption 
and cheap labor. The need for long-term thinking and a different response strategy is 
prevalent. An alternative to relief aid would be to utilize the refugees’ skills to help build up 
the economy.  
  The Syrian people are known for being hard working and the Kingdom could benefit 
from this. As a government official joked in several interviews: “Back in the days the Jews 
were all over the Middle East making money except from one country: Syria. You know 
why? Because they were such hard workers”.142  Nevertheless, the refugees have met several 
governmental barriers to pursuing acceptable living standards in the host communities. “The 
government does not grant work permits to Syrian refugees or Syrians without residency,” 
according to the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC).
143
 If the Syrian 
refugees were permitted to work, they could contribute to the society with skills, taxes and 
general income generating activity. Despite the fact that Syrians are not granted work permits, 
around 160,000 Syrians are working, illegally as unprivileged, unskilled, informal workers, in 
the northern governorates of Jordan according to estimates by the Ministry of Labor (MoL).
144
 
These are the governorates with the highest number of “poverty pockets”, areas in which 
more than 25 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.
145
 Due to the focus on the 
Syrian crisis, the poor Jordanians have been set aside as assistance has primarily benefited the 
Syrian refugees, excluding and further impoverishing Jordanians.
146
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 The challenges that have erupted in the northern governorates serve as an example of 
how unfortunate relief work can be compared to letting refugees pursue livelihood. A 
Jordanian carpenter who left Mafraq to go work in the capital for half the wage after losing 
work to a Syrian put it this way: “There is no longer room for Jordanians in Jordan”. 147 
Confirming the Mafraq man’s experience, a young Syrian from the southern city of Dera’a 
revealed that he and his brother worked up to 18 hours per day lifting bricks for about one 
third of what Jordanian workers make in similar jobs.
148
 There is no control over the illegal 
labor market, and employers pay their employees accordingly in reaction to supply and 
demand. The same unfairness arises in the housing market. Due to supply and demand, 
increased population and cash assistance provided to Syrian refugees, rents have increased 
drastically. In Mafraq rents are reported to have increased by 400 percent, and Jordanians 
have been forced to move out of their houses as they cannot afford increased rent.
149
 
International donors and aid agencies are indirectly contributing to push down wages and 
push up the price for accommodation and commodities by supporting Syrian refugees with 
food, shelter, and maybe even cash assistance.
150
 This relief aid makes it possible for Syrians 
working in the informal market to accept lower wages and pay higher rent than the poor 
Jordanians because their basic necessities are already covered, forcing Jordanians to quit their 
jobs and move out of their houses.  
 As a result of the permanency of the refugee crisis, the Jordanian perception of their 
Syrian guests is changing. On radio morning shows, angry listeners are calling in daily, 
complaining about the Syrian presence in the Kingdom, wishing them gone – out of the 
country.
151
 “In the beginning of the crisis, the people [Jordanians] opened their doors to their 
Syrian brothers. The atmosphere is different now and the Syrians are being blamed for 
everything that is wrong”.152 Due to existing policies and programming the refugees have not 
been given the opportunity to contribute to economic growth and – by themselves – reduce 
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social tensions.
153
 Consequently, the refugees have been viewed through the perspectives of 
cost and economic burden. If GoJ allowed the refugees to contribute to the society with their 
skills in addition to tax income, the country as a whole could benefit from the refugee influx. 
Until now, this is not a strategy GoJ has utilized. If nothing is being done to solve the tensions 
between refugees and locals, the problems could spread. Many Jordanians have the 
impression that GoJ cares more about the refugees than its own nationals, and this could tip 
the balance of stability in the wrong direction.  
 
Demographic composition as determinant 
Similar to the case with Iraqi refugees in Syria as presented in the chapter on theoretical 
background, the lack of political nature among the refugees and the low level of conflict can 
partially be explained by the demographic and social composition of the refugees. There are, 
of course, other characteristics in a refugee population that play a role in this matter that are 
beyond the scope of this study , for example, how the ethnic and religious balance among the 
refugees interact with the balance of the receiving country. This is highly relevant in the case 
of Syrian refugees in Jordan as a large number of Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRSs) 
among the refugees could disturb the fragile political balance in Jordan. However, GoJ does 
not accept PRSs.
154
 Here follows the findings of the third hypothesis: 
 
Table 4: Demographic composition as determinant for stability. 
Present in 
Jordan 
Women, children elderly 
(disproportionate) 
Educated/  
wealthy 
No participation in conflict 
Yes X  
(majority, but not sustainable in a 
long term perspective) 
 X  
(number of participants grows 
with the protracted crisis) 
No  X  
(the majority is from 
the rural south) 
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Gender and age 
According to Lendeers’ theory presented in the previous chapter, a disproportionate share of 
women, children, and elderly among the refugees will serve as a stabilizing factor. Of the 
refugees registered by UNHCR, 51 percent are female and 49 percent are male. The 
distribution of men and women is quite balanced in other words. 44 percent of the refugees 
are in the age group of 18-59, while 53 percent are below the age of 18. Only 3 percent of the 
registered refugees are over the age of 60. Elderly are certainly not overrepresented among the 
refugees in Jordan nor in any of the other countries receiving Syrian refugees, much likely 
due to the difficulties of movement in Syria and challenging border crossings. Women, 
children, and elderly together constitute the majority of 80 percent.
155
 However, boys in the 
age group 12-17 would be more correctly placed in the “more prone to violence”-group 
making the percentage of refugees “less prone to violence” 73 percent – still a majority.  
The explanation for putting boys in that group is twofold: as the crisis drags out, 
young boys grow up and reach the “critical age” of being more prone to violence and; due to 
an overstretched Jordanian school system; a “lost generation” is appearing. Boys and young 
men – not confined to the homes like women and girls – yet with nothing to do are becoming 
angry and frustrated, feeling a lack of purpose.
156
 A refugee mother told a group of reporters 
from World Vision magazine that her children play war and torture all day long, no doubt 
based on things they witnessed in Syria.
157
 In both camps and host communities, children, 
primarily boys, have come into conflict with the law, including participation in civil unrest, 
vandalism, and theft. During a field visit to Za’atari a group of around 50 boys passed the car, 
screaming and yelling at each other. Boys down to the age where they can barely walk 
followed the big boys waving sticks in the air and throwing stones, chasing the rival “gang”. 
No one seemed to care to stop this aggressive behavior. There have been reports of cars that 
have been attacked with stones in the camp, so the driver rolled up the window and continued 
in a hurry.
158
  
Theresa Betancourt, Assistant Professor and Director of Harvard University’s 
Research Program on Children and Global Adversity states research shows that youth who are 
suffering from war trauma, or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), who relate to a 
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particular ideology – even by identifying with extremist groups involved in violence – suffer 
less mental health distress. Being able to make sense of the terrible things the refugees have 
witnessed is a basic human need and such a need can often be manipulated.
159
 Assessments 
conducted in both Za’atari and host communities have reported that young boys have been 
returning to Syria to join armed groups – out of their own will, peer pressure, or pressure from 
family.
160
  The teenagers are offered social services and maybe jobs in exchange for 
ideological support”.161 Joining a jihadi- or another group fighting in Syria can give young 
boys a feeling of belonging as well as a purpose in life that they can’t obtain living “regular” 
lives in Jordan, where the schools are filled to capacity and legal pursuit of livelihood is close 
to impossible.
162
 As the Za’atari camp director put it: “In the camp, a young boy’s biggest 
wish is to get a wheelbarrow so he can be able to help the family. When he is tired of the 
wheelbarrow, he wants a truck. When he gets older, he wants a gun to protect his family. This 
is the future for the youth in Za’atari, unless we get them into the school system and can 
connect studying with prospects of a job”.163 Today, 43 percent of Syrian school-age children 
are out of school.
164
 
Even though women, children, and elderly constitute the majority in the Syrian 
refugee population in Jordan, they are not disproportionally overrepresented. Almost 30 
percent, 180,000 that is, can be considered to fall into the group “more prone to violence”. 
180,000 are more than enough to cause trouble in a Kingdom of 6.5 million balancing on the 
fence of stability in a destabilized region. A lost generation made passive by the lack of 
opportunities could bear loads of frustration that can have severe long-term implications for 
Jordan’s stability regardless of the percentage they constitute. Moreover, as will be elaborated 
below, refugees that have participated in the conflict are more prone to political violence. 
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Over time, when these boys return from fighting in Syria, the refugee population can develop 
from being what Lischer describes as “situational refugees” to a “state-in-exile”.165 
 
Level of education and wealth 
One of the factors Lendeers cites in explaining why there had not been any spillover from Iraq 
to Syria was the high percentage of academics and educated professionals among the refugee 
population. Like women, children, and elderly, educated refugees are less likely to engage in 
conflict. He also considered educated refugees to be less likely to engage in conflict because 
the Iraqi intelligentsia did not choose sides in the conflict and were therefore forced to flee by 
an emerging and fragile leadership fearing obstacles and opposition.
166
 The percentage of 
academics and professionals among the Syrian refugees in Jordan is relatively low; while this 
contributes to Jordan’s stability, popular demographics do not fully account for it. 
Refugees fleeing the fighting in urban areas like Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo 
tend to seek refuge in either Lebanon or Turkey as those borders are closer to their respective 
cities. Refugees from the eastern parts of Syria naturally try to cross the border to Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Hence, for natural and geographic reasons, most of the refugees in Jordan are from 
the southern, poorer, and more rural parts of Syria such as the Dera’a region. In Za’atari for 
example, 90 percent of the population was from the Dera’a region.167 On a national basis, 53 
percent of the registered refugees were from Dera’a, 15 percent from Homs, 8 percent from 
Damascus and 4 percent from Hama.
168
  The vast majority of heads of household surveyed in 
CARE’s assessment of Syrian refugees from April 2013 had only completed primary 
education with the exception of those now living in the city of Zarqa where almost as many 
heads of household had completed secondary education. A larger number of households in 
Zarqa originate from urban areas like Damascus and Homs where access to education is more 
widespread. This could explain the higher level of education in this city.
169
 
Academics and educated professionals are not only inherently less likely to engage in 
violent actions. There are socio-economic implications of such a characteristic too. Unlike the 
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Iraqi refugees in both Syria and Jordan who were largely from urban areas, the majority of 
Syrian refugees come from larger towns, villages, and rural areas as shown above.
170
 Director 
of DRSJ BG Dr. al-Hamoud described the Syrian refugees in Jordan as “not educated”, 
without any money, and with habits not accepted in Jordan. The Iraqi refugees that came to 
the Kingdom in 2003 were described as the opposite. Many of the Iraqi refugees were wealthy 
and consequently less dependent on aid from the state and humanitarian organizations.
171
 
Iraqis who had a certain amount of money deposited in Jordanian banks were also granted 
work permits.
172  In general, Iraqis did not seek work in big numbers, but created work 
opportunities by investing and establishing industries and companies.
173
 The Syrian refugees 
on the other hand “don’t have any money. They need to be supported or they need to 
work”.174 Syrians that are not contributing to society due to the lack of work permits pose a 
severe drain on the already scarce resources in Jordan. 
A high percentage of wealthy and educated individuals among the refugee population 
are likely to work as a stabilizing factor as they would be less dependent on the receiving state 
and be less of a burden for the society in general. This is nevertheless not the case among the 
Syrian refugees in Jordan. Even if it there was a disproportionate distribution of educated 
refugees, it would not benefit society unless GoJ opened up for Syrians to work in the formal 
market. Today, most of the Syrians with paid work are informal and unskilled labor, not 
necessarily building on their capacities from Syria.
175
 
 
Will to return and participation in conflict prior to fleeing  
A third determining feature that characterizes the refugee population presented by several 
scholars is whether the refugees prior to fleeing did participate in the conflict or not.
176
 As 
Lischer claims; “refugees who flee targeted persecution or defeat in a civil war will have 
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higher level of political and military organization than refugees who escape general chaos or 
destruction”.177 Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) conducted an 
assessment in April 2014 where almost 80 percent of the refugees reported that bombardment, 
destruction or arbitrary arrests were reasons for fleeing.
178
 Two features characterizing 
“situational refugees” stand out as particularly decisive: their wish to return as long as there is 
a cessation in hostilities, regardless of the outcome of the conflict; and their absence of 
participation in the conflict as they fled the country as innocent victims.
179
 
First, most Syrian refugees in Jordan and other host countries wish to return to their 
homes as soon as possible. In fact, refugees are already returning voluntarily to Syria. In 
August 2013, there were, for the first time since the outbreak of the conflict, more refugees 
returning to Syria than entering into Jordan – a trend which continued through 2013.180 When 
leaving Syria, many of the refugees took their family members and what they could carry and 
fled, leaving the house as it was – but bringing along the key hoping to return in the not so 
distant future. Several Syrians have returned to check on their houses and belongings.
181
 They 
want to return permanently when they feel safe enough, or when jobs, schools, and health 
services are back in order. This is one reason why few Syrians are requesting a permanent 
move to a third country in another continent – it would make it more difficult to return to 
Syria when the conflict ends.
182
 However, as the conflict prolongs, the belief that the Syrian 
influx is temporary and reversible when fighting cease or ends, begin to fade. In Za’atari, two 
young Syrian girls ages around 4 and 8, holding hands, were asked where they came from. 
The oldest one whispered “min al-harb” in Arabic meaning “from the war”. They shook their 
heads when asked if they wanted to go back.
183
 A recent survey from Oxfam showed that 
more than 65 percent of the refugees surveyed fear they might not be able to go back to Syria 
despite desperately wanting to return.
184
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Second, as the crisis protracts and the refugee situation become more permanent, there 
is a possibility of stronger political cohesion among refugees and increased recruitment to 
military action in the home country, especially if the refugees’ needs in the receiving country 
are not being met. As discussed above, young boys, lacking a purpose in life, are easily 
recruited to political and military purposes. After returning from fighting in Syria, their 
characteristics place them in one of the groups believed to be more prone to violence. The 
refugees may have been “situational refugees” in the beginning, with limited political 
cohesion and little military activity making them less prone to violence. With time however, 
their situation could develop to resemblance Lischer’s third and most violent category: “state-
in-exile”, or rather “opposition(s)-in-exile” due to the fractionalized opposition in Syria.  
The characteristics of Lischer’s third category are as follows: origin of flight is defeat 
in civil war; requirements for voluntary return are new government or military victory; initial 
political organization is strong and often grows in exile.
185
 A possible scenario for the future 
of Syria is that the Assad regime stays in power.
186
 As the majority of the refugees in Jordan 
are from the Dera’a region where the uprising started, there might come to hostility between 
the regime and the population from Dera’a. The proximity from the Dera’a region to the 
refugees in Jordan is alarming. The distance from Za’atari to Dera’a city is no more than 
41km, and from Dera’a to Irbid in Jordan it is half that distance.187 Cross-border attacks from 
both sides in similar situations are not unprecedented in the Kingdom as this was a 
determinant factor leading to the civil war in the 1970s. In that case, the Palestinian refugees 
did not flee as a state-in-exile, but developed over time into a highly organized militant state 
in exile.
188
 
The will to return and the lack of participation prior to flight are characteristics that, 
without a doubt, prevent refugees from turning violent or engaging in actions in order to 
change the outcome of the conflict at home. However, these characteristics are as discussed 
dynamic and can change over time if the refugee situation prolongs and alternatives for 
building a new life in the receiving country are limited. 
 
* * * 
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Table 4.4 shows the superficial findings of the analysis above. The hypotheses tested above 
where all tripartite. Every part of the hypotheses, or every factor, is in the table below placed 
in one of two groups: preventing or triggering destabilization. If a factor is found present in 
Jordan, it is regarded as preventing destabilization, while the absence of a factor is regarded a 
trigger of destabilization. 
Table 5: Determinants, sum of determinants in Jordan.  
 Preventing destabilization Triggering destabilization 
Economic and foreign policy as determinants 2 1 
Institutional capacity as determinant 1 2 
Demographic composition as determinant 2 1 
Total 5 4 
 
The table shows that five factors are preventing destabilization and four factors are triggering 
destabilization. This gives an impression of the fragile balance of stability in Jordan that could 
be disrupted very easily. Nevertheless, the table does not show the whole picture as some of 
the factors necessarily will prove more important and influential than others.  
 
Conclusion 
What can be seen as features that have upheld stability in Jordan are the majority’s wish for 
stability and the composition of the refugees which makes them more peaceful. Even more 
important for the prevailing stability has been the Kingdom’s capacity and willingness to 
provide security and control its borders by using its extensive army and renowned intelligence 
service. However, the decisive factor for keeping the Kingdom stable is the support it receives 
from its foreign patrons through monetary and military support which help the country pay 
the military and intelligence expenses, as well as pay for the political support from the 
citizens through subsidies and public sector employment. As long as Jordan’s powerful 
patrons don’t want Jordan to fall, it will not fall. 
On the other hand, it is important to notice that the findings are also dynamic, seemingly 
going in the direction of stronger security measures from the government, more potential 
dissatisfaction among both refugees and locals, in addition to less money from the 
humanitarian organizations due to donor fatigue. Features that could tip the balance over to 
destabilization are the strategies for dealing with the refugees. If the refugees are not allowed 
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to pursue livelihood and violations are being enforced even more than they are today, the 
dissatisfaction will grow as the crisis persists. The strategy of stacking refugees in camps by 
force might also prove to be destabilizing like the protracted crisis in Jordan with the 
Palestinian refugee camps in the 1970s. 
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4. Conclusion: Stable for now, but not necessarily 
forever  
 
Over the years, most research on the spread of conflict as a consequence of refugee influxes 
globally gathered empirical evidence from African countries and focused on cases where 
conflict had already spread. Considering the constant refugee situation in the Middle East 
over the past fifty years, surprisingly few studies have presented empirical analysis about the 
spread of conflict due to refugee influxes in the Middle East, for example following the 
Palestinian refugee influxes to both Jordan and Lebanon in the 1970s. In contrast to most of 
the previous literature in the field, the main objective of this thesis has been to examine the 
absence of conflict in Jordan after receiving refugees constituting approximately 10 percent of 
the original population over the past three years, 2011-2014. As the international media has 
noted: “Jordan is surprisingly stable for the moment”.189 The thesis’ objective has been to 
explain why. In order to understand the absence of tension, three tripartite hypotheses were 
deducted from previous literature. The hypotheses of economic and foreign policy as 
determinants, institutional capacity for handling the refugee influx as determinant, and 
demographic composition of the refugees as determinant laid the foundation for the empirical 
analysis. 
It became evident while testing the hypotheses empirically that some of the findings 
were more important and influential than others when it came to preserving Jordan’s status 
quo. First of all, the majority’s wish for stabilization, or rather their fear of going down the 
same path as its neighboring countries Iraq and Syria, was found to maintain the stability. 
This is an important factor, but not the most influential. A majority for stability could prove 
stabilizing, but if there is a strong and influential minority with the opposite vision, a majority 
might not prove enough to stop them. This minority could, for example, be the Jordanian 
political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front (IAF).  IAF has for long 
been the strongest political alternative in Jordan. However, IAF has been struck by regression 
due to its boycott of political process in past years as well as regional change. The IAF lost 
their momentum when the party split into warring camps over what happened in Egypt when 
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the Muslim Brotherhood were in power. For the time being, there are no alternatives to the 
Monarchy and the status quo – and the people prefer stability. 190 
The second, and arguably most influential finding, is the support given to the 
Kingdom from different actors such as the GGC, Saudi Arabia alone, and the US. It has been 
claimed that the refugee crisis came as an economic gift from above to Jordan which was 
struggling with financial problems. This assumption is supported by the fact that the protests 
and tensions that characterized the social scene early during the Arab Spring were 
economically motivated. These protests have subsided over the past years arguably as a result 
of the IMF being less strict on enforcing austerity measures due to the refugee crisis; the 
money allocated from the GCC all together and from Saudi Arabia individually, to alleviate 
civil unrest; and the immense economic and military aid from the loyal ally US who is 
desperately holding on to its last true subordinate state left in the region. As long as these 
actors don’t want Jordan to fall, and they keep on pouring money into the country’s failing 
budget, the country is likely to remain stable.  
A third finding that contributes to upholding the stability is Jordan’s willingness and 
capability to control the borders and provide security. Jordan’s extensive army and its 
renowned intelligence service – paid for by loyal patrons – have proved a valuable tool for the 
GoJ. When taking into consideration that smuggling activity across the border increased 300 
percent from the previous year (2013) and illegal border crossings also rose by 250 percent, a 
legitimate question to ask would be why the increasing illegal border activity has not led to 
more violent actions or incidents. The answer could be found in the many reports of arrests 
related to illegal border activity. GID’s arrest of the Jordanian who returned from fighting in 
Syria living in Za’atari with Syrian identity papers, as exemplified in the analysis, show the 
vast range of the intelligence service. This is very likely to scare off other insurgents or at 
least force them to keep a low profile.   
Regardless of these seemingly solid stabilizing factors, the balance of stability in 
Jordan is fragile and could be disrupted very easily. In relation to this, it is very important to 
emphasize the dynamic character of several of the findings. How Jordanian institutions are 
handling the refugees, for example, is seemingly going in the direction of stronger security 
measures from the government and less freedom for the refugees. This could prove to be the 
drop that tips the balance over to destabilization. Dissatisfaction among the refugees will 
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grow as the crisis persists if they are not allowed to pursue their livelihood and violations to 
this are being enforced harder than they are today. Moreover, historically – in Jordan but also 
other places in the Middle East and Africa – gathering refugees in camps in close proximity to 
the border has not proved to be a successful strategy in most cases of protracted refugee crisis. 
It was, for example, the Palestinian refugee camps that were the centre for the Palestinian 
armed movements and where the cross-border attacks to Israel started in the 1970s. Creeping 
donor fatigue is also a future concern for Jordan. Relief aid is very expensive and not 
sustainable for a long term crisis. With creeping donor fatigue already showing, a new 
strategy for handling the Syrian refugees in Jordan is needed. 
The demographic composition of the Syrian refugees in Jordan proved initially to be a 
stabilizing factor, but while analyzing the hypothesis the dynamic feature of the hypothesis 
was revealed. As for now, there is a majority of women, children, and refugees in the Syrian 
refugee population. However, as argued in the analysis, the longer the crisis persists, the more 
young traumatized boys grow up and become more prone to violence. Many of these boys are 
not offered education and therefore see no prospects for an honest living. Consequently, they 
are easier for radical and extremist groups to recruit. Moreover, the number of refugees 
enlisted into and partaking in violent activities in Syria from Jordan is growing as the crisis 
protracts, and so does the share of refugees that have participated in the conflict. As Lischer 
argues, this group is more likely to engage in violent activity due to their participation on one 
of the sides of the conflict. It could be a matter of time before there are reports of any severe 
cross border attacks. This destabilizing factor also depends on the willingness, competence 
and range of the Jordanian intelligence services that until now have proved sufficient. 
In conclusion, what has upheld Jordan’s status quo the past three years is mainly the 
support it received from powerful loyal patrons. Stability is being secured through monetary 
and military support which helps the country pay the military and intelligence expenses 
needed to prevent direct spillover from Syria. This support also pays for the political support 
from the citizens through subsidies and public sector employment in an effort to shield the 
citizens from the de facto deteriorating economic situation. For the past three years, 2011-
2014, this has been the situation in Jordan, but there are no guarantees that this will continue. 
The longer the crisis lasts and as long as there is no long-term strategy for handling the 
refugees, the higher is the risk of violent activities and destabilization in Jordan – either as a 
direct result of the crisis in Syria or as a result of deteriorating conditions for refugees, as well 
as citizens in Jordan. 
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Final Remarks  
In the regional context, Jordan has always been the less interesting country. Jordan has not 
been insignificant at all, but due to its long lasting stability and, compared to its neighbors, 
marginal geopolitical influence, it has not caught the interest of scholars of political science 
and international relations. Now, there is a different story. As the West’s last secure foothold 
in the region, Jordan is strategically important in the ongoing regional geopolitical proxy war 
in connection with the Syrian crisis. Amman is the international hub for the humanitarian 
institutions dealing with the human consequences of the crisis, and important regional and 
global actors such as Saudi Arabia and the US have a high presence in the country.  In order 
to continue to play the role as the eye of the storm for the geopolitical actors dealing with the 
biggest crisis of this century, the country needs to avoid destabilization and spillover from its 
neighbor in the north.  
This limited study presents only a selection of factors that explain the surprising 
stability of Jordan. There are, of course, other factors that are equally important and it would 
benefit the receiving country and other stakeholders if these were studied thoroughly, such as 
the case of PRSs who are denied access to Jordan and international and domestic 
consequences of this. Writing this thesis created a myriad of questions that would be 
interesting to explore further. Would the Jordanian economy have failed if it were not for the 
Syrian crisis? Would the Arab Spring have gained foothold in Jordan if it were not for the 
bloody civil war next door? How can Jordan keep its status quo with a protracted refugee 
crisis, permanent water shortage, and increasing donor fatigue? How could donor fatigue be 
avoided or how to avoid dependence of donor support? Should there be rules to the ratio 
between aid given to refugees and poor citizens in order to avoid tensions between them, and 
dissatisfaction with the government? Would it be possible for the humanitarian agencies to 
draw up a tentative suggestion or plan for protracted refugee crisis and the transition from 
relief aid to a more sustainable aid type, at least for countries that have been the “victims” of 
several refugee waves over the past decades such as Jordan? 
These are all difficult questions, and there are no easy answers. Nevertheless, it is 
important to raise these questions, with the aim of reaching the best solution to this crisis as 
well as future crisis. Two things are essential in order to address these challenging questions: 
open communication and further research. The most alarming finding that came up while 
conducting fieldwork for this thesis was the lack of honest communication and the extent of 
disagreement between different actors upon fundamental facts concerning the refugee 
situation. The communication between the actors involved in the refugee crisis must improve 
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– especially between international and domestic actors, including the UNHCR and the GoJ. 
More independent research and facts are needed in order to know how to handle this dynamic 
situation. This study offers no more than a snapshot of the time it was conducted. In order to 
understand the dynamics of the situation it is important to study the course of events while 
they are happening and also once it is all over. As for now, the trajectory of the situation in 
Jordan is far from set.  
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